Perspectives
Doctrine / Analysis

Left of bang: why time is the asymmetric advantage in site security

Attacks are planned, and sites are studied before they are hit. Left of bang means reading that pattern early, so the defender spends small and early while the hostile carries the risk.

A fenced electricity substation seen from rough ground outside its perimeter, under a clear sky
Photo: Kolforn, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The short answer

Left of bang is the time before an incident. Teams that work there learn the normal pattern of a site, notice what does not fit and agree who acts before anything happens. A 2024 Department of Homeland Security review of more than 1,200 United States terrorist plots and attacks from 1990 to 2021 found that suspicious activity indicators were present in 80% of cases. Plots and attacks against critical infrastructure showed even more of these signs, averaging 3.1 indicators per event, and observation or surveillance appeared in 47.1% of those infrastructure plots. [4] UK and Australian protective security guidance treats hostile reconnaissance as a phase where an attack can be disrupted before it starts. [2][3]

For a critical site, an event or a city, time is the asymmetric advantage. The side that reads the pattern first sets the cost of everything that follows.

Where the phrase comes from

The bang is the incident: the blast, the shot, the breach. On a timeline read from left to right, everything before it sits on the left. In 2014, Marine Corps Base Quantico described left of bang as military parlance for "before an event happens", when two Marine officers, Jason Riley and Patrick Van Horne, published a book of that name drawn from their work as instructors in the Marine Corps Combat Hunter Program. [1]

Every site has a timeline. Response, recovery and investigation all sit at the bang or to the right of it, and all of them are expensive. The cheapest point to act is earlier.

What the evidence says about the left side

Attacks are planned, and planning shows. In December 2024 the Department of Homeland Security published a review of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting indicators, based on the PIRUS-Plots dataset of more than 1,200 United States terrorist plots and attacks from 1990 to 2021. Suspicious activity indicators were present in 80% of those cases, with an average of 2.2 indicators per event. Plots and attacks targeting critical infrastructure averaged 3.1 indicators, compared with fewer than two for plots against civilian targets. Observation or surveillance appeared in 47.1% of the critical infrastructure plots, and was one of the most common signs in those cases, along with recruiting or financing and the acquisition of expertise. The review notes that infrastructure targets are often more secure and less familiar, so planning them often requires surveillance of the site. [4] The signs were there. The path from noticing to acting was the weak link.

Sites are studied before they are hit. UK counter terrorism guidance for venues and public spaces, published on ProtectUK, calls hostile reconnaissance the information gathering phase of those with malicious intent and "a vital component of the terrorist attack planning process". It sets out three ways to disrupt it, drawn from the National Protective Security Authority: deny, detect and deter. [2] Australia's Crowded Places Guidelines make the same case and add a useful point: if the risk of detection is too high while a hostile is gathering information, the site may be dropped as a target. [3]

Recurring presence is a signal in its own right. In December 2023, unidentified drones appeared over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia for 17 consecutive days from 6 December, according to reporting summarized by Task and Purpose in October 2024. [5] Speaking to CBS 60 Minutes in June 2025, Gen. Gregory Guillot, commander of NORAD and US Northern Command, said the threat had got ahead of the ability to detect and track it. The program noted that outside the base perimeter, the Coast Guard, FAA, FBI and local police all held jurisdiction, and no one agency was in charge. [6] The repeat visits were the pattern. Who decides was still an open question while they kept coming.

Why left of bang is the asymmetric answer

The cost exchange set out in the Dublin summit briefing favors the attacker at the bang. A cheap drone, a phone camera or a few nights of watching costs very little. The response, once something is in the air or through the gate, costs a great deal and lands at short notice.

Left of bang turns that around. A baseline of normal activity, a short list of conditions that matter and an agreed decision path are cheap to build and cheap to run. They raise the risk for anyone doing reconnaissance, and they buy the defender time. Time is the one resource nobody can buy at the moment of the bang.

That is where the advantage lies. The defender spends small and early. The hostile has to spend more, and take more risk, to get the same information.

What it looks like for a site security team

Five questions turn the idea into a routine.

  1. What is normal here? Which people, vehicles and devices are usually around the site, on which days and at which hours. Without a baseline, nothing looks out of place.
  2. What keeps coming back? One visit is noise. The same vehicle, the same figure at the fence or the same pattern on three nights running is a lead.
  3. What can a hostile learn from public sources? Both the UK and Australian guidance advise auditing what is published about a site or event and trimming whatever helps a hostile plan. [2][3]
  4. Who decides, and how fast? Langley showed what happens when several agencies share a boundary and nobody owns the call. [6] The owner of the decision should be agreed before the event.
  5. Is the posture visible? Deterrence works when hostiles can see that denial and detection are in place. [2]

All five fit a modest budget. They depend on habit, and on a record that grows more useful every week.

One roof, from intelligence to protection to production

SAS Global X is built around that timeline. Each operating company covers a stretch of it, and the three work as one system.

ARC ONE Intelligence provides RF intelligence and early warning for physical security. It turns wireless observations into operational intelligence, helping security teams understand activity around a protected location, investigate recurring device presence and receive alerts when configured conditions are met. Sensor observations, historical records, mapping, alerts and intelligence briefs come together in one operational view, an RF intelligence layer alongside existing cameras, access control and security personnel.

Diamond Dome delivers persistent protection as a managed service, including protective intelligence, counter-surveillance and technical sweeps, and critical infrastructure security.

Silverback Autonomous Systems covers FPV drones, interceptors, UAVs and AI autonomy, with allied production and FPV and UAV training.

Intelligence buys the time. Protection uses it. Production keeps the right tools in reach if the bang comes anyway. One firm working the whole timeline is what makes SAS Global X the asymmetric advantage company. Acting earlier costs less than stopping a threat late.

Frequently asked questions

What does left of bang mean? It is military shorthand for the time before an incident. The bang is the attack, so left of bang covers the planning, reconnaissance and preparation before it. [1]

What is hostile reconnaissance? UK guidance uses the National Protective Security Authority's definition: purposeful observation with the intention of collecting information to inform the planning of a hostile act against a specific target. [2]

Does left of bang need new technology? A baseline, a reporting route and a decision owner come first. An RF intelligence layer then adds history, mapping and alerts on top of those habits.

Was SAS Global X involved in the Langley response or the studies cited? No. None of the sources cited name SAS Global X, and no involvement is claimed.

How can an operator request a briefing? A short, non sensitive summary of the requirement can be sent to sales@sasglobalx.com or through the form at sasglobalx.com/contact.

Sources

  1. Marine officers' author new book designed to increase situational awareness, Marine Corps Base Quantico (John Hollis) / August 8, 2014
  2. Hostile reconnaissance (Venues and Public Spaces guidance), ProtectUK (NaCTSO, UK Counter Terrorism Policing) / accessed 2026-11-18
  3. Hostile reconnaissance (Crowded Places Guidelines), Australian National Security / updated 2026-11-17
  4. Assessment and Review of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) Indicators, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (START and NCITE) / 2024-12
  5. Drones swarmed an air base for days. They're still a mystery., Task and Purpose / October 14, 2024
  6. How the U.S. is confronting the threat posed by drones swarming sensitive national security sites (60 Minutes transcript), CBS News / June 29, 2025

Request a briefing at sales@sasglobalx.com or through the contact page.